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Chapter 8: Crisis Management
A Lesson in Crisis Communications and 
Transparency from Sub-Saharan Africa
By Dane Kiambi
T
he increased penetration of 
smart phones in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the enthusiasm to-
ward social media highlights the 
need for crisis managers working 
in the region to sharpen their crisis manage-
ment skills to eectively protect and restore 
the reputations of their organizations.
Research has consistently shown that 
Africa is the only region of the world where 
growth in mobile connections is expected in 
the next ve years. Coupled with the ongoing 
increase in high-speed internet connections, 
there is little doubt that creating and sharing 
information online among locals will reach 
new proportions.
Research by Portland Communications 
showed that South Africa was the continent’s 
most active country on Twitter, with over 5 
million tweets sent in the fourth quarter of 
2011. Kenya was second, with close to 2.5 
million tweets sent. Sixty-eight percent of 
those polled said they used Twitter to moni-
tor news. 
e enthusiasm toward social media in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the high pace of 
information sharing during a crisis became 
evident in Kenya in September 2013, fol-
lowing allegations that some Kenya Defense 
Forces (KDF) soldiers had looted the West-
gate Shopping Mall in the capital city Nairobi 
during a rescue mission at the mall following 
a terrorist attack.
Public interest in the allegations of loot-
ing against the Kenyan soldiers was height-
ened by the fact that the Kenyan military was 
one of the most reputable institutions in the 
country before the accusations emerged. Over 
the years, the Kenyan military has earned 
international accolades for its exemplary 
professionalism during the African Union 
and United Nations peacekeeping missions in 
troubled parts of the world.
Attacks on the media only 
served to energize and 
unite the traditional media, 
bloggers and micro-bloggers 
against the military.
e Kenyan military’s entry into troubled 
Somalia in 2012 in pursuit of al-Qaeda-linked 
al Shabaab militants and the subsequent 
defeat of the terrorist group in major towns in 
Somalia earned the Kenyan soldiers further 
local and international admiration. A survey 
conducted in July 2012 by Gallup found that 
the military was the most trusted institution 
in Kenya, with a trust index of 87 percent.
e military’s reputation among the Ke-
nyan public, however, took a serious beating 
aer the accusations of soldiers looting the 
shopping mall surfaced. A December 2013 
survey by Ipsos Synovate showed that pub-
lic trust in the military had dropped to 32 
percent.
Keen media observers were quick to heap 
the blame on the rank and le of the KDF 
for mishandling the crisis over allegations of 
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some soldiers looting the shopping mall.
e Daily Nation, the largest newspaper 
in Kenya by circulation, was one of the rst 
to show and report on surveillance foot-
age showing scores of soldiers rummaging 
through one of the supermarkets in the shop-
ping mall and leaving with white polythene 
bags whose contents could not be established.
In response to the allegations, the Kenyan 
military vehemently denied that its soldiers 
had been involved in any the of property at 
the shopping mall. rough a press statement 
by the cabinet secretary for Defense, the mili-
tary bolstered its long-standing professional 
credentials, and reiterated that the moral ber 
of its soldiers was exemplary.  
e denial almost immediately triggered 
a deluge of accusations of a cover-up and set 
Twitter, Facebook, and other social media 
channels on re. Within a period of minutes, 
thousands of Kenyans on Facebook, YouTube, 
and Twitter shared the CCTV footage show-
ing Kenyan soldiers leaving a supermarket in 
the ill-fated mall with white polythene bags. 
A second denial—by the Chief of Defense 
Forces General Julius Karang—that the sol-
diers had not been involved in the looting of 
the shops seemed to anger social media users 
further. In his follow-up denial, Karangi ex-
plained that the white polythene bags that sol-
diers carried from the supermarket contained 
drinking water and that they had obtained 
the authority of their commanders to take the 
water with them. 
As the military chief was issuing this de-
nial, two Kenya military spokespeople were 
contradicting each other in the media. While 
spokesperson Emmanuel Chirchir maintained 
that no money had been lost in the ill-fated 
Westgate mall, another spokesperson, Cyrus 
Oguna, was telling the media that a bank and 
a casino had lost approximately $34,000. 
Two days aer the rst denial, the mili-
tary’s top brass, led by Karangi, met with 
members of two parliamentary committees—
the National Security and the Defense and 
Foreign Relations committees—to further 
strategize on how the committees would ap-
parently come to the aid of the military in a 
bid to ward o the damaging allegations.  
At a press conference denying that soldiers 
had looted the mall, the chairpeople of the 
two parliamentary committees criticized the 
media, particularly social media, for malign-
ing the name of Kenyan soldiers.
e apparent shielding of the military 
by the two parliamentary committees made 
matters worse for the military. Top stand-up 
comedians even mimicked the soldiers and 
the parliamentarians in their combined eort 
to conceal the truth from Kenyans. Kenya’s 
Parliament is the worst rated institution in 
terms of trust and performance due to endless 
eorts by legislators to award themselves huge 
wages and allowances through amendments 
to existing law.
Writing in the Daily Nation, columnist 
Macharia Gaitho lambasted the military’s top 
brass for denying the obvious. “e Westgate 
terrorist attack united us as a nation, but that 
does not mean we must sweep inconvenient 
truths under the carpet,” he wrote, asking for 
the soldiers to accept responsibility for the 
looting of the mall and the punishment of the 
culprits.
Aer weeks of futile public denials, the 
commanders emerged before the media 
cameras one aernoon and owned up to the 
mistake. Karangi informed the country that 
investigators had identied two soldiers who 
had looted the mall and that they had been 
red. A few more soldiers were being inves-
tigated in connection with the mall looting, 
and the outcome would be communicated to 
the public in due course, Karangi noted.
Crisis communication managers can learn 
a few lessons from how the Kenyan military 
handled the crisis:
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Do not deny when there is overwhelm-■■
ing evidence against your organization. 
In this day and age, it doesn’t take much 
eort for organizational stakeholders and 
citizen journalists to authenticate allega-
tions against an organization. It boggles 
the mind why the Kenyan military em-
braced the denial strategy even as CCTV 
cameras obtained from the damaged 
mall clearly showed some of its soldiers 
leaving the mall with white bags. e fast 
paced sharing of the videos among Ke-
nyans on social media ensured that they 
would greet the military’s denial with 
contempt and anger.
Do not seek allies whose reputation is ■■
questionable. e Kenyan military em-
braced another suicidal crisis manage-
ment strategy when it sought protection 
from members of the two parliamentary 
committees. e emergence of legisla-
tors defending the soldiers from the 
accusations seemed to only intensify the 
crisis. Kenyan legislators seem to have 
the worst reputation among the public as 
a result of successive attempts to amend 
the law and award themselves huge pay. 
In a crisis, it would be advisable to asso-
ciate with allies who have credibility with 
your stakeholders.
If you are to blame, take responsibility ■■
and apologize, and do it quickly. Im-
mediately aer the CCTV videos against 
the Kenyan soldiers emerged, many on 
social media demanded that the military 
take responsibility and issue an apology 
over the scandal. Because the military 
took longer to accept responsibility and 
apologize to the public than it should 
have, the crisis continued to grow, ulti-
mately damaging the long-standing good 
reputation that the military had enjoyed 
among Kenyans. 
Maintain a consistent message from ■■
the spokespeople. Two military spokes-
people issued contradictory messages 
regarding whether or not some money 
had been lost to the looters of the mall. 
Inconsistent messages from an organiza-
tion in a crisis are perceived to be a sign 
of inability to make solid and truthful 
decisions. Following the conicting 
messages, the Kenyan public lambasted 
the military for concocting lies. Why 
have two spokespersons anyway? One 
spokesperson would have been enough 
to handle the Kenyan military crisis.
Do not attack the media.■■  At a press 
conference to defend the soldiers from 
allegations of looting the mall, the two 
chairpersons of the parliamentary com-
mittees accused the media of falsely 
blaming the soldiers. e legislators 
also attacked Kenyans on social media 
for maligning the name of the soldiers. 
e attacks on the media only served to 
energize and unite the traditional media, 
bloggers and micro-bloggers against the 
military. For more than a week, newspa-
per headlines, radio and TV news, and 
posts on social media were devoted to 
the military crisis. In near unison, the 
media accused the top brass of the mili-
tary of orchestrating a cover-up of the 
scandal and demanded the resignation 
of the Chief of Defense Forces, General 
Karangi. 
Had the Kenyan military handled the crisis 
with more transparency and urgency, they 
could have succeeded in protecting the repu-
tation of the institution from harm. PRN
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